Good afternoon, I am pleased to be here today with you, Kevin and Mayor Benjamin and have a conversation about the importance of municipal bonds to your constituents. Your have heard from Mayor Benjamin how important municipal bonds are to the citizens of Columbia; Kevin has explained how critical tax- free municipal bond financing is to building our airports. My role here is to complement these 2 gentlemen, explain our firm’s role in the marketplace and give you a history of the municipal bond market, share a few of my experiences.  I read in the invite I am a “seasoned expert”……which means I am long in the tooth so I think I bring a historical perspective that hopefully will help you.

So first, let me give you a little background information about our firm. Bernardi Securities is a Chicago based municipal bond specialty firm, established in 1984. We are regulated by the SEC, FINRA, state agencies, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board(MSRB). We are a municipal bond market maker and rely on our in house credit research team. We  publish and speak on current issues like: threat to tax-exemption, market transparency and disclosure I began my career, 1980; Our Chairman, Edward Bernardi began career in the late 1950’s. What we do is important to the clients we serve. They count on the municipal bond market and they count on us to help them navigate through it.

I am here today because I believe what we have to say is very important to you and your constituents. This is not so much about Ron Bernardi’s interest as it is about the interests of the people living in Columbia, South Carolina, the people I serve, the people living  in your congressional districts. When you leave today, I hope you will remember this: Municipal bonds build America.

The municipal bond market is very important to this country. Generally, it functions well, day in day out, year after year and has been doing so for over 100 years. It is far more efficient, more transparent than when I began in 1980, improving every year. It is far from perfect, but it is a sound , good, fair marketplace. And,  it needs to continue to evolve, progress in sensible, measured ways. Congress’ mission should be  to help the municipal bond market evolve and improve,  not curtail or hinder it. Repeal tax-exemption, curtail it any meaningful way and it will be harmed. And your constituents will bear the brunt of the effects. Not Bernardi Securities, not Mayor Benjamin and not the airport council ….your constituents.

So what is Bernardi Securities role in the market? We have three primary functions: First, we assist issuers in planning capital projects and raising funds for infrastructure projects. Ithaca , NY in August of 2013 refinanced approximately $ 3 million loan;  it lowered its annual payments, freeing up funds to be used for other community investments.  Bernardi underwrote that transaction. Rothschild, Wisconsin recently updated its water/sewer plant;  we  raised  several million dollars it needs for that community investment. These are two  examples of communities needing  access to low cost capital to make improvements. The present day municipal bond market allows them to do this.

Second, we assist community banks and individual investors invest capital; we help them manage their bond portfolios relying on our credit research as the foundation.

Lastly, we are a market maker, trading bonds after the  issue has come to market. Markets need liquidity; investors want assurance they can sell their bonds at a reasonable price and timing before maturity- we help provide this liquidity. Our clients are conservative, they regard asset class as their mattress money. Generally, investors appreciate the security municipal bonds offer and many like to invest in local projects.

There are  two key points to make here:

  1. Municipal  market encourages investors to invest conservatively and that is good for all of us.
  2. In our experience, local investment tends to be an excellent governor of behavior; projects tend to be more sensible.

The notion that tax-exemption fosters profligate projects is wrong; sure,  there are situations, but almost universally in my experience over 30 years, communities borrow what they can afford to pay back and tax-exemption allows them to borrow at a lower rate. These are healthy results the market helps to produce.

I want to briefly touch upon the history of the municipal market. And the important role it  has played in the national and local economy. Again, I say to you,  municipal bonds have built America.

A 2013 engineering society study calls for $3.6 trillion in infrastructure  investments  by 2020. Our infrastructure is aging, needs updating.  The municipal  market should continue to have the primary role in making these investments and any contemplated federal policy changes should not result in harming the market. We need  PUBLIC PURPOSE INFRASTRUCURE PROJECTS (roads, schools, water/sewer plants, county courthouse, airports, village halls, public libraries….) After all, 75% of country’s infrastructure is financed with municipal bonds.  Large and small projects are possible and the present day, tax- free market structure is well suited to raise capital for the fragmented needs of the market.

Additionally, bond issuance creates meaningful, productive jobs paying a salary above minimum wage.

Importantly, municipal bond investors comprise a diverse cross section our population, saving for their retirements. It is incorrect to think the municipal bond market benefits only or primarily the wealthy.  The premise is false. I will have more to say on this issue later.

Lastly, U.S. public finance market is envied around the world. The Chinese national government has begun a trial program to develop a transparent, locally controlled  municipal bond market in order to clean up its current, central government controlled system. India has explored developing  a municipal bond market. Certain European governments,   where public finance  historically is controlled by central governments,  are adapting dynamics like our model. I have studied public  finance systems around the world  and none I know of come close to ours when measuring a system’s  economic efficiency, project execution time efficiency, local  control in decision making. Our  system is the “cat’s meow”  of the all the world’s public finance systems!

Turning it upside down, substantively altering it would be a serious misstep.

The history of the municipal bond market runs parallel to this nation’s history in many respects. Tax-exemption was created  in 1913 – helps ensure  “reciprocal immunity” ; the municipal bond market’s  roots go back much further. We have all heard the famous quote: “ power to tax involves  the power to destroy”. These are the words of Chief Justice John Marshall in  McColloch versus Maryland, 1819. The decision limits the ability of a state to intrude on sovereignty of federal government and  vice versa.

In 1894, the Supreme Court ruled in Pollack vs. Farmers Loan Trust that federal income taxes on interest were unconstitutional. Additionally, the decision established the notion of “inter-governmental immunity” which protects state and local governments borrowing abilities from federal government interference. The Pollack decision  is  the reason why when the  16th amendment (federal income tax) was enacted, federal taxation of municipal bond income was prohibited.

This prohibition was written into the law because Congress realized if the  federal government could arbitrarily tax municipal bond  income, then state and local governments would not enjoy freedom from possible federal government overreach. Let’s turn this around: imagine the outcry here in Washington if a state government began taxing income earned on u.s treasury bonds.

RECIPROCAL  IMMUNITY PROVISION, R.I. P. as I like to call it, prevents this from occurring. R.I.P. is fundamental to the federalist system our nation is built around. For this reason, unlike any other deduction, the exclusion of municipal  bond income was codified into law in the Revenue Act of 1913.

Tax-exemption is unique from all  other tax expenditures. Tax-exemption is Not some tax loophole inserted into the tax code in the middle of the night. It is rooted in the federalist system, it is time tested, it has survived multiple recessions, two world wars, the Great Depression and the Great Recession.

So how does the market operate,  why it is attractive for issuers, investors, the general population? First of all, it is a localized market. It is fragmented and this feature is intrinsic to its nature; as long as R.I.P. exists, the market will  remain fragmented. It is attractive for issuers because it’s  relatively deep and liquid market and tax-exempt status allows more affordable funding. Solid quality issuers today borrow at approximately 2.50% (“ aa”, index as of 6/23/14)  for 10 year loan, 3.50% for 30 years.

These low borrowing rates makes financing the new school, the village hall expansion, road improvement project fixing all those winter potholes in your town more affordable. If the market worked poorly, would borrowing rates be this low?

The present day market helps ensure localized control. Inherent in our system,  is this crucial dynamic ……to me, this is the most important feature of our public finance system. There are approximately 50,000 distinct issuers of municipal bonds – look at your local tax bill, most of the line item issuers , issue bonds. The market gives those issuers access to capital , allows them to structure their borrowings the best way to suit their needs.

Your constituents decide IF a school is built, its scope, how to pay for it.

Your constituents decide if the county courthouse should be expanded, how many years to take to pay off loan.

Your constituents decide if the public library, public parks should be built, the  location.

This is a healthy dynamic, and a  very good governor of cost and efficiency.

The market is attractive for investors: Over 70% of outstanding municipal bonds are held by individual investor.

They like to invest in the market for these reasons:

  1. Preservation of principal & low default rates
  2. Over the long term,  it is uncorrelated to economic swings
  3. It offers the opportunity to invest directly in the local community
  4. It offers countless options for investors
  5. And Tax-exempt income is an over-arching reason asset class is attractive

Repeal tax-exemption, cap the exemption at 28% as some proposals call for and  your constituents will see higher taxes, higher fees, fewer capital improvements in their communities, scaled back  projects. If you believe in the principles of federalism embodied in the constitution.  If  you believe state and local governments should have wide latitude to independently finance public purpose infrastructure projects that your citizens need, want and are willing to pay for. Then ladies and gentlemen, radical changes to the present day muni market should not occur.

It is really that simple.

Having said that, our market needs improvement and there are steps that can easily be taken to make improvements. A modified BAB Program would be helpful as a complement, not a replacement to current market. A lot of talk about the success of BAB program. There were many and overall the program was good as it stabilized the market.

But the BAB program had some serious shortcomings, inefficiencies of its own.

The Tax-Credit Option is a non-starter, in my view. The market is thin, highly illiquid, non- transparent. There is minimal investor interest in tax credit market structure.  Tax-credit was offered as a BAB option and it was near universally ignored. Issuers and investors chose not to use it.

So how do we make our market better for Mayor Benjamin and residents of Columbia, SC and  your constituents? Most importantly, the market needs clarity; uncertainty brings higher cost.  And oftentimes, clarity requires singularity.  The  municipal  market needs clarity NOW!

By that I mean tax exemption for public purpose issuance is untouchable. That should be the resounding message. And then clearly define “public purpose”. That should be the topic of debate. Perhaps, it should be narrowed. In my view certain issuance currently tax-free, should be prohibited thereby returning tax money to the treasury.

Secondly, stop talking about and  advancing proposals focused on  partial or prospective repeal; no 28% cap .  This adds to the air of uncertainty and increases borrowing costs for your constituents. Thirdly, increase the Bank –Qualified  limit from its current $10 million cap.  Doing so will increase bank investing in infrastructure projects and should  lower borrowing costs.

Lastly, issuer  disclosure must continue to improve.  It is much better today than what existed a handful of years ago, but there is work to do in this area. I see we have about 20 minutes remaining for your questions so I will end with this, repeating how I began my remarks:

Muni bonds build America. The municipal bond market is very important to this country. We need Congress’ help to build upon, improve what we have here.

Thank you.

July 2, 2014

 

$5.225 Million Electric System Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 2014

The Bonds are being issued for the purpose of refunding, on a current basis, the 2014 through 2030 maturities of the City’s Series 2010A Taxable Electric System Revenue Bonds (Build America Bonds-Direct Pay).  The City joins a number of other Wisconsin municipalities taking advantage of extraordinary redemption provisions to refund their direct-pay Build America Bonds (BABs).  The BAB program originally offered a federal interest rate subsidy of 35%; however, those subsidy payments were reduced during last year’s federal sequestration budget cuts.  A lesser reduction of 7.2% has been implemented for fiscal 2014.  With sequestration cuts in place and a relatively low interest rate environment, the city could realize considerable savings refunding the BABs with tax-exempt debt.

The Series 2014 Bonds are payable only from and secured by a pledge of Net Revenues derived from the operation of the City’s Electric System. Furthermore, the City covenants to maintain Net Revenues sufficient to cover annual debt service at least 1.25x and show at least 1.25x coverage on any existing and proposed bond issues.  The Bonds are also secured by a debt service reserve account, which shall be funded at the lesser of: (a) 10% of the proceeds of the Bonds, (b) maximum annual debt service on the Bonds in any future Bond Year; and (c) 125% of average annual debt service on the Bonds.   Total revenue bond debt service coverage after tax equivalent transfers was 1.40x in fiscal year 2013. The Bonds are non-rated.

The City of Black River Falls, with a 2010 U.S. Census population of 3,618 and a current estimated population of 3,600, comprises an area of 1,699 acres and is located approximately 130 miles southeast of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.

 

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By Ronald P. Bernardi

Detroit Settles on UTGO Debt

The family vacation photo that made its debut this past December, “Will Detroit turn BOND upside down?”, returns today, right side up.

Last week Detroit reached a settlement with three bond insurers over the treatment of its unlimited tax general obligation bonds (UTGO) agreeing to pay this group of creditors 74 cents on the dollar of the $388 million owed.  The remaining 26% surrendered by UTGO bond creditors will be assigned to support various pension plans for city employees.  Outstanding insurance policies on the UTGO bonds remain in effect ensuring full payment of debt service to investors as originally scheduled.  The city’s bankruptcy plan prior to this settlement offered as little as 15 cents on the dollar to the UTGO creditor group.  It  will be amended to reflect this settlement and is subject to approval by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes.

 BOND, Right Side up?

According to the final official statement issued and approved by City of Detroit, Michigan Series 2005-B bond issue, “The Bonds are full faith and credit unlimited tax general obligations of the City duly authorized by the City’s voters and secured by a pledge of the full faith and credit of the City. The City is authorized and required to by law to levy and collect ad valorem taxes without limitation as to rate or amount upon all taxable property in the City to pay the principal of and interest on the Bonds when due.”

Despite the obvious clarity of the text, City of Detroit emergency manager Kevyn Orr, until last week, claimed the Series 2005-B UTGO bond issue (and other similarly structured issues, as well) was “unsecured” — he viewed it’s security no different than the unpaid coffee vendor’s bill. As we wrote last December, there is a great deal riding on Detroit’s workout plan and the need for it to treat UTGO and LTGO bondholders equitably and differently than other creditors.

In our December market update, we suggested the city implement a distribution “waterfall structure” and establish a hierarchy delineating the order and percentage priority in which funds are to be distributed to various classes of debt holders. Such an approach helps ensure that different types of creditors receive the priority of payment they deserve.

Last week’s agreement, if approved by Judge Rhodes, is a significant positive step for Detroit and moves the city in the direction we suggested months ago. We are heartened by Mr. Orr’s about face and believe it is exceptionally important to Detroit’s future. His motivations for changing his position are unknown to us and we give him great credit for doing so. Below, we offer our conjecture as to why he agreed to quintuple his offer to UTGO creditors:

  • Original offer was untenable.  Orr recognized the city’s offering of 15-20 cents on the dollar to voter approved UTGO bond investors with a dedicated millage backing was untenable in Judge Rhode’s court — words like “duly authorized” and “full faith and credit” matter to the Court, we believe.
  • Increased negotiating leverage with other creditors. The agreement removes an important creditor group from the negotiating table, increasing pressure on other, larger creditors to settle. Judge Rhodes has consistently warned creditors to settle with the city. Recently he told creditors, “The message is now is the time to negotiate.” There’s a rough justice in bankruptcy and Judge Rhodes strikes us as someone willing to mete out a solution as he sees fit and move on. The remaining creditors may want to return to the negotiating table to cut a deal.
  • Better potential to market future municipal bonds. The workout crafted with bond insurers means bondholders will be paid in full; prospectively, this should help Detroit sell future debt issues to investors.

We are hopeful Mr. Orr reaches a similarly equitable agreement with LTGO creditors quickly. Settlement with this creditor group is important for Detroit. Any potential settlement will be less than the 74 cents on the dollar agreed to with UTGO creditors consistent with a “waterfall structure” solution. But, in our view, it should be substantially greater than the 15-20 cents payout as cited in the city’s filed plan. This creditor group — and others too — have millage dedicated to their security interest and should be treated differently, better than creditors lacking this claim on millage. The city can justify to the Court paying a higher rate of recovery to this group. An equitable agreement with this creditor group will strengthen Detroit’s access to capital markets in the future. Importantly, it will also help lift the undeserving pall currently hovering over much of the LTGO debt issued by municipalities across Michigan.

Still “Waiting for Godot” in BOND

Samuel Beckett’s 1953 tragicomedy depicts the story of two homeless men, Vladimir and Estragon, who wait endlessly for someone named Godot. They are unsure who he is and what he will bring them. They are hopeful when they meet him he will have a solution to their plight. Godot never arrives.

Our metaphorical BOND has endured its own frustrating version of “Waiting for Godot” in recent years, too. Bankruptcy filings in Stockton, San Bernardino and now Detroit have failed to answer a significant question overhanging the market — Are voter approved, unlimited tax general obligation bonds “secured”?

Mr. Orr claimed otherwise, until last week. Bond investors, insurers and other market participants strongly disagreed with him. The settlement means Mr. Orr has changed his mind and now agrees with this group. This is a fine development for Detroit — and other Michigan bond issuers and investors —  in part, because it helps to debunk the notion voter approved general obligation bonds are “unsecured”.

But the agreement between Detroit and UTGO creditors, if approved, obviates the need for Judge Rhodes of having to answer the key question. For many investors holding UTGO and LTGO bonds issued by Michigan municipalities, this is a disappointing and frustrating outcome of last week’s agreement. Clarity requires singularity oftentimes and this question is one such case. Similar to what Vladimir and Estragon feel as they wait in vain for Godot, many investors wish the question would be answered in a court of law.

Until this question is definitively answered in a courtroom or by state legislatures, certain issuers will continue to use the lack of clarity as leverage. They will dance around the concepts of “willingness” and “ability” to pay debt service on their bonds forcing investors to litigate to protect their interests. This dynamic creates market uncertainty and investor unease. Both are bad for the market, issuers and investors.

The question at hand needs to be answered by a thoughtful court. It appears Judge Rhodes will not be presented with the opportunity to answer it. And it appears Godot will not be arriving anytime soon to answer the question either.

Ronald P. Bernardi
President and CEO
April 15, 2014

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By Jeffrey D. Irish

Following Janet Yellen’s recent testimony, many investors may just want to wait for Federal Reserve policy makers to raise interest rates before committing money to the bond market. After all, the fed funds rate has been held in the 0% to 0.25% range for years so rates must go up, right? The answer is perhaps, but interest rate timers may have wasted four years waiting to catch a bigger fish – and just missed it. Most of the hike in interest rates that investors have been waiting for may have already happened.

In just the past 15 months, the yield on the benchmark, 10-year Treasury note has climbed from 1.65% to 2.71% where it stands as of this writing. That’s a 106 basis point increase in yield at the same time the fed funds rate has remained unchanged.

 

Analysis of past four Fed tightening cycles

Shown below is an analysis of the past four Fed credit tightening cycles along with the resultant yield for the 10-year Treasury note during the same period. You will notice that the fed funds rate actually ended up higher than the yield on the Treasury in three of the four cycles.

July 1, 2004 thru September 2007

  • Fed funds rate increased from 1.00% to 5.25% – plus 425 basis points
  • 10-year Treasury note yield decreased from 4.56% to 4.52% – lower by 4 basis points

February 30, 1999 thru May 16, 2000

  • Fed funds rate increased from 4.75% to 6.50% – plus 175 basis points:
  • 10-year Treasury note yield increased from 5.28% to 6.27% – plus 99 basis points

February 4, 1993 thru February 1, 1995

  • Fed funds rate increased from 3% to 6% – plus 300 basis points:
  • 10-year Treasury note yield increased from 6.41% to 7.49% – plus 108 basis points

January 1988 thru February 1989*

  • Fed funds rate increased from 6.50% to 9.75% – plus 325 basis points:
  • 10-year Treasury note yield increased from 8.79% to 8.98% – plus 19 basis points

*Fed funds rate figures for this period are approximated as Federal Reserve decisions were not officially announced at the time.

It is important to remember that the Fed – aside from the quantitative easing policies, which are now being tapered – is not usually buying or selling longer dated bonds. Traders, investors and other market participants will generally dictate the yields on long bonds. Pricing is based in large part on future inflation and growth expectations. As the economy has shown signs of recovery, these participants have been driving the yields of long bonds upward to compensate for the expected erosion of net return that is caused by inflation.

When the Fed does start to raise the fed funds rate, a perverse thing, as far as those on the sidelines are concerned, usually happens as evidenced by the preceding analysis – the rates on long-term bonds peak and then start to fall. This happens because the prime rate is tied to the fed funds rate, which is directly tied to almost all forms of consumer and most business borrowing. When these rates go up the cost of borrowing goes up, which slows the economy. A slowing economy is usually welcome news for bond investors because costs of goods and services tend to stabilize or even fall, which preserves the buying power of fixed income investments.

The rising-rate advantage of individual bonds

The reason many typical, buy and hold, municipal bond investors may not be buying longer-term bonds right now is because they have been scared into thinking that the value of their investment will decline sharply if interest rates rise. It is the dreaded total return argument.

For those buying individual bonds, perhaps the most important thing to consider is that you know the score of the game at the outset. Unlike bond fund investors ¬– whose investment lacks a maturity date and therefore will lose principal if rates rise – the individual bond buyer will receive their money back at maturity. From the first inning, the investor buying individual bonds knows the final score: the yield and the maturity. Fund investors lack that certainty – their return will fluctuate.

Calculating the cost of waiting

Here is an illustration to bring this all home. Assume one has $100,000 available to invest. Let’s say you can put the money in a long-term bond with a 4.00% coupon, priced at par or park it in a one-year bond yielding 0.50%. After a year, the investor in the ultra-short bond has received $500 while the long-term buyer earned $4,000. The short-term investor retains their options but at a steep cost.

Let’s say the ultra-short investor guessed correctly, though, and after one-year he or she is able to invest in a bond yielding 5.00%. The 5.00% bond generates $1,000 more interest annually than the 4.00% bond but it will take about four years for the short-term investor just to break even with the investor who put his money into the 4.00% bond today.

If the investor is right about the direction of rates but wrong about the size of the move – for instance, one is only able to invest at 4.75% – it will take about five years for him to catch up. If rates remain where they are, or decline, the investor will never catch up.

We are not advocating abandoning your current investment parameters to buy 30-year bonds. Rather, stick to your existing ladder and forget about trying to time the market. There’s a hefty price to pay for thinking you can predict the unpredictable.

As always, please contact us if you have any questions, or would like us to review your portfolio with you.

Jeffrey D. Irish
Vice President
March 28th 2014

 

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The municipal bond market’s behavior in 2013 could be summed up by the old saying that the Chinese word for “crisis” – wēijī – is actually composed of two characters representing “danger” and “opportunity.” John F. Kennedy is credited for popularizing this concept in a 1959 speech, and it has since become a staple of motivational speakers looking to inspire their audiences to seize the opportunities that appear in the midst of uncertain times.

This is a great saying, but a little research shows that this is another one of those stories that is a little too good to be true. Wēi does roughly translate to danger, but the Chinese character jī actually is closer in meaning to “crucial/critical point” than opportunity.

In that context, however, wēijī could be an even more appropriate term to use when considering the year 2013:

  • Yields shot up. The 10-year U.S. Treasury moved from a low yield of 1.63% in May to finish the year at 3.02%.
  • Index returns soured. Municipal bond indexes recorded their worst performance since 1994.
  • Great Rotation speculation escalated. Municipal bond mutual funds ended the year with a nearly eight month-long streak of weekly withdrawals. This supplemented the speculation of a “Great Rotation” from bonds into the stock market.
  • Detroit doom looms. Detroit’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing has opened up legal questions that could have significant effects on the entire municipal debt marketplace.

Historians indeed may look back on 2013 as having been a crucial point for municipal debt investors. On the other hand, we at Bernardi Securities see it as a time when the fundamentals of our investment process and philosophy – separate account, professionally managed portfolios utilizing rigorous credit analysis and a disciplined adherence to a laddering strategy – have become ever more important to our clients.

In short, we think that this possible crucial point offers real opportunity to the committed municipal bond investor.

Interest rates – Are they finally moving (and staying) up?

Ever since the Federal Reserve embarked on its unprecedented quantitative easing program to force interest rates down to record-low levels, fixed income investors have been awaiting the inevitable return to more normalized levels. 2013 could possibly have been the turning point, as the U.S. economy has finally exhibited signs of breaking out from tepid – though sustained – growth.

We have also seen the Fed make its first tentative steps to ease its flood of liquidity into the market, via its decision in late December to begin tapering its purchases of longer-term Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities.

The yield curve has responded accordingly, as investors anticipate higher rates sooner. This is demonstrated by the steepening of the yield curve, with the tax-exempt municipal curve graphed below. Short term rates are still anchored by the Fed, though longer-term rates have risen as the market anticipates higher growth and inflation – hence, higher yields – in the future.


Source Bloomberg

The obvious question is whether this is the start of a sustained rise in interest rates. Our answer is – we don’t know and we will not speculate. We do not make aggressive interest rates bets, and we certainly have seen a number of very smart analysts prematurely call an end to this low rate environment.

Furthermore, we have seen a number of 50 to 60 basis point increases in rates since the 2008 financial crisis, only to see subsequent rallies in the bond market. Indeed, an unexpectedly weak employment report this month has led to the 10-year Treasury moving back towards 2.75%, which is roughly where it was back in August.

This reminds us once again of one of the strengths of the laddered bond portfolio for the committed municipal bond investor – it takes fear (or overconfidence, for that matter) out of the equation, and replaces it with a disciplined approach to investing. You may recall the December 11th perspective and strategy discussion written by one of our vice presidents, Jeff Irish. Jeff discussed the cost of waiting for rates to rise while money stagnates in near zero-percent money market or ultra short-term bond funds. Investors waiting on the sidelines for an increase in market yields are losing more and more of the “time value” of their money. In the meantime, the owner of a laddered municipal bond portfolio has been receiving a stream of income.

It pays to remember that we are now approaching the sixth year of a zero interest rate environment. We don’t know if any of us could have foreseen this back in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. It is also worth noting that Federal Reserve officials have made it clear that while the Fed is beginning to taper longer-term bond purchases, they expect short-term rates to stay near zero for at least a couple of more years.

In light of recent history and continued uncertainty, we maintain that a commitment to the bond ladder gives the investor the best means for seeking income.

The stampede from bond funds and ETFs

As you well know, one of the fundamental rules of fixed income investing is that the prices of existing bonds decline as rates increase. 2013’s decline in bond prices translated into higher yields in the intermediate and longer-term markets. Tax-exempt municipal bonds were affected along with taxable securities, as reflected in the 2.6% loss recorded by the benchmark Barclays Aggregate Municipal Bond index.

The average general and insured municipal bond fund lost 4.1% in 2013, while the iShares National AMT-Free Muni Bond exchange traded fund (MUB) lost 3.44%. Such figures spurred withdrawals from municipal bond mutual funds and sales of muni ETFs in 2013, which forced such funds to sell bonds into a declining market in order to raise cash for redemptions. This in turn led to further weakness in the market and a divergence of fund and ETF prices from net asset value (NAV).

On the other hand, almost all of our separately managed, laddered portfolios did better than the Barclays index, and avoided most of the volatility seen in the mutual fund and ETF marketplaces. As noted in our August 28th piece entitled Outperforming the Madness of Municipal Bond Fund Herds, the separately managed bond account allows for greater control at times such as these. It allows the investor to avoid being swept up in rush of the crowd to the exits; instead, he or she has the ability to select or remove specific bonds from their portfolio, and the timing of such actions. This is particularly helpful when harvesting losses to shield other investment income and capital gains.

The holder of a laddered account actually finds a silver lining in rising rates, in that maturing securities now can be reinvested at higher yields, while soon-to-mature securities can be swapped into higher-yielding longer-term issues. This is one of the most important benefits of this structure for the investor looking for income. Once again, the bond ladder offers great opportunities to the committed municipal bond investor.

Detroit and other discontents

Detroit’s seeking protection from its creditors via a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing was probably the biggest headline news of the year. We were not especially surprised to see this happen, but what was surprising was Detroit’s emergency manager’s declaration that general obligation debt holders had no priority on claims. In essence, such debt holders were told to get in the same line for payment with everyone from city employees to the City Hall coffee vendor.

If this stands, it would violate all understandings of how general obligation debt is prioritized in a bankruptcy filing. Our president, Ronald P. Bernardi, wrote an extensive piece on this on December 20th that is well worth reviewing again. Among the points he makes is that some national precedents could be set by the eventual rulings of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court overseeing Detroit’s filing.

Investors have speculated on which other issuers may experience similar distress. An August 26th front-page Barron’s article detailed the weak credit profile of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, leading to a significant selloff of its debt. The pension funding woes of the state of Illinois also have come under increasing scrutiny. These problems have not only put pressure on Puerto Rico and Illinois state issues, but have weighed on the municipal market overall.

On the other hand, this has reinforced the importance of another key part of the Bernardi process – a rigorous attention to credit quality. Our managed accounts have never invested in Detroit, and we have steered clear of Illinois state debt and Puerto Rico issues for several years. Paying close attention to the three pillars of credit research – deal purpose, deal structure, and underlying credit quality – has enabled our clients to avoid both widely publicized credit issues and others less famous, but no less severe.

Bernardi’s credit research team also offers opportunities as well as protection for our investors. As noted, we have avoided Illinois state debt for some time; however, there are many well-run municipalities in Illinois whose debt trades at higher levels due solely to being located in this state. Our knowledge of such municipalities allows us to invest in this debt and capture these higher rates for our clients, while maintaining a vigilant eye on their ongoing finances to make sure that both interest payments and principal are protected. We consider our clients’ portfolios as their “mattress money,” and always act with that in mind.

Moving on, and benefitting, from 2013

2013 was a challenging year for the fixed income market, both taxable and tax-exempt. The upwards shift in the yield curve, large and continuing withdrawals from municipal bond funds and ETFs, and the headlines coming out of Detroit and other pressured issuers can leave the investor justifiably wondering if the municipal bond market is indeed in dangerous territory (or wēi). Particularly when looking at the increase in intermediate and long-term rates during the year, the issue of whether we are at a crucial or critical turning point (or jī) for the market can be vigorously debated.

On the other hand, the Bernardi commitment to separate account, laddered portfolios offers an opportunity to those committed to seeking income, and especially tax-exempt income. Almost all of our portfolios handled the decline in the municipal market better than the primary Barclays index or the average mutual fund or ETF. The laddering structure means that our clients have bonds that will soon mature and can be reinvested at new, higher yields. Finally, our credit research process helps our investors avoid pitfalls like Detroit, while finding quality issuers offering above-market yields.

Bernardi Securities is now entering its 30th year of turning potential “danger” into “opportunity” for our clients. We remain committed to doing so for the benefit of our clients in the years to come.

Thank you for your continued confidence in our bond portfolio research and management process. Please always feel free to contact us if you have any questions, or would like us to review your portfolio with you.

Scott R. Rausch, CFA
Portfolio Manager
January 22, 2014

 

By Ronald P. Bernardi

 

Will the Detroit Chapter 9 bankruptcy turn the municipal bond world upside down? A random vacation photo captured this concern fairly well. With such a big question looming over the market, let’s review the ways in which the largest municipal bankruptcy in our nation’s history may set precedents for municipalities across the country.

The vacation photo worth 1700 words

Bond, Colorado sits at 6600 feet in the northwestern part of the state approximately 135 miles west of Denver. The Colorado River cuts through the town that is home to 183 hardy people. The summers are cool, mild, dry and short; the winters are long and cold. It is both a beautiful and desolate place.

State Highway 131 runs north to south snaking along portions of the meandering Colorado River. A Union Pacific rail line runs parallel to State Highway 131 before taking a hard turn crossing it in Bond.

This past September I spent some unscheduled time in Bond, forced to stop at the intersection of Highway 131 and the Union Pacific rail line. A combination of flashing red crossing signals (there were no gates) and a rumbling, seemingly endless freight train pulling a lot of Colorado coal allowed me to take in Bond for about 10 minutes.

Instead of passing the time counting freight cars I took in the vast landscape, the nearby Colorado and noticed a photo opportunity. I asked my trusted co-pilot of these last 29 years, my wife Beth, to lean out the window and take a photograph.

Beth snapped the photo and forwarded it to me electronically. It arrived on my desktop in an inverted state and I knew immediately I could use it somehow. Today, the photo makes its illustrative debut.

Detroit, Michigan lies 1400 miles to the east of Bond. What transpires in Motor City in the coming months may very well turn the municipal bond world upside down.

Full faith and credit pledge questioned

Earlier this month U. S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes ruled that Detroit is eligible to enter into Chapter 9 bankruptcy and pension benefits are not entitled to any heightened protection in municipal bankruptcy. His ruling means the city of Detroit government’s workers and retirees cannot count on state constitution guarantees to protect pension benefits. Practically speaking, the ruling serves as an invitation for creditors to reach a settlement with the city and hopefully will lead to meaningful out of court negotiations on pension reform. His ruling came in spite of vigorous objections filed by union and retirees’ lawyers. Bond investors and bond insurers did not object to the city’s bankruptcy filing.

Judge Rhodes’s 143 page “Opinion Regarding Eligibility” serves as a Chapter 9 tutorial. It provides a painstakingly thorough summary of how Detroit arrived at its current disastrous state and his rationale for granting the city’s request to file. We do not envy the position Judge Rhodes finds himself in the middle of for this is only the beginning of what will prove to be a long, bruising battle of a very complicated situation. A union and multiple pension systems have filed an appeal of the ruling. To borrow from John Paul Jones, the father of the U.S. Navy, the various class of creditors “have just begun to fight!”

Many of Detroit’s creditors will attempt to advance the notion that their interests are superior to all others. Judge Rhodes will have to parse through all of the legal nuances and details before approving an equitable exit plan for Detroit and its many creditors. The bottom line is obvious — there simply are insufficient funds to honor all unsecured obligations and therefore, most creditors will be forced to take less than what they are owed.

That said, certain debt obligations are legally superior because they are secured by a lien on a specific revenue stream. Debt obligations secured by a revenue stream with adequate current cash flow to cover the debt must be honored. Detroit has outstanding debt obligations that fall into this category and these bonds should not be diminished as part of Chapter 9 unless creditors agree to do so.

Detroit also has other outstanding debt obligations where determining payment priority may be problematical for Judge Rhodes if the city maintains its current position. Certain creditors stand on firmer ground than others regarding these claims, in our view. It is imperative any workout plan advanced by the city and approved by Judge Rhodes recognize that within this group, certain debt obligations are superior to other debts. Specifically, I am referring to Detroit’s voter approved unlimited tax general obligation bonds (UTGO) and limited tax general obligation bonds (LTGO).

Earlier this year, Detroit’s emergency manager proclaimed these debt obligations are “unsecured” and therefore would be treated similarly to all other “unsecured ” debts. His position is that voter approved UTGO and LTGO bondholders should take the same haircut as all other unsecured creditors and receive pennies on the dollar. This is a shortsighted and incorrect position, in our view.

If the city’s position on this issue remains unchanged, a key question should be addressed by Judge Rhodes as part of Detroit’s reorganization — how should general obligation debt be treated relative to other debt obligations, secured and unsecured?

Firstly, we want to make very clear that Bernardi Securities, Inc. has not traded Detroit debt for decades. Detroit has been an unfit credit for conservative bond portfolios for many years. Therefore, it has never qualified for the Bernardi Securities approved list of credits. We have no axe to grind related to Detroit, MI debt.

That said, what does “full faith and credit” mean? Are voter approved unlimited tax general obligation bonds “unsecured”?

“The Series 2005-B Bonds are being issued for the purpose of financing the cost of certain capital projects of the City and paying costs of issuance associated with the Series 2005-B Bonds…The Bonds are full faith and credit unlimited tax general obligations of the City duly authorized by the City’s voters and secured by a pledge of the full faith and credit of the City. The City is authorized and required to by law to levy and collect ad valorem taxes without limitation as to rate or amount upon all taxable property in the City to pay the principal of and interest on the Bonds when due.”

The affirmations above are taken directly from the final official statement of the City of Detroit, Michigan Series 2005-B bond issue. Yet, the city’s emergency manager claims the issue is “unsecured”.

Years ago, voters approved a tax increase to specifically fund the issue’s debt service. Investors relied on tax levy segregation and the above security interest language in deciding to lend money to the city. Today, these taxes are being collected in sufficient amount to pay principal and interest on this bond issue. Yet, the city has decided to divert these taxes for general fund purposes.

Clarity needed on Detroit’s debt issues

The city’s misallocation of these funds raises issues and questions that Judge Rhodes will have to address in order for Detroit to cleanly emerge from bankruptcy. The judge’s ruling is clear that the final debt adjustment plan must treat similar creditors equally. To us, an investor in a voter approved unlimited tax general obligation bond issue is not in the same credit line as a limited tax general obligation bond holder, a certificate of participation debt holder, a note holder or the coffee vendor provided the tax collections are sufficient to cover interest and principal payments. This seems fairly obvious to us.

Perhaps, Mr. Orr will change his tactics toward bondholders given this month’s ruling and what it means for potential reduction of pension liabilities. If not, Judge Rhodes needs to exercise a degree of judicial discretion applying principles of equity in order to fashion an exit plan for the city. Emergency manager Orr’s one-size-fits-all debt holder plan is inappropriate.

Clarity is needed from the judge on numerous issues related to debt issues:

  • Secured vs. unsecured debt. Clarity as to which debt is “secured” and which debt is “unsecured”; what do those terms mean?
  • Legality of unauthorized tax collection. Clarity as to whether the voter approved unlimited ad valorem tax putatively securing Series 2005-B bonds (and other similar tax levies) can be legally assessed and collected if used for purposes other than what the voters authorized. Doesn’t the city’s misallocation of these funds make the tax invalid? If not, why bother holding an election?
  • Legality of tax revenue diversion. Clarity as to whether revenue from tax millage collection can legally be diverted from LTGO bond payments to cover the city’s operating expenses. Does the state constitution, in fact, allow for the diversion of these revenues?
  • Legality of Orr’s casino revenue/DIP plan. Clarity as to whether Mr. Orr’s plan to use casino revenues to secure Detroit’s proposed debtor-in-possession financing (DIP) is legal. Is granting a super-priority status to new DIP lenders equitable to general obligation bondholders if they are forced to accept Mr. Orr’s pennies on the dollar offer?

A sensible solution may be to implement a distribution waterfall structure for “unsecured” debt holders, similar to how private equity operates. Establishing a hierarchy delineating the order and priority in which funds will be distributed to various classes of debt holders will ensure that different types of investors have priority of payment compared to others.

There is a great deal for Detroit riding on its workout plan. If it does not treat UTGO and LTGO bondholders equitably it will increase its future borrowing costs. Additionally, the plan’s final details will have important repercussions for debt issues throughout Michigan. This is especially true for UTGO and LTGO bond issues for communities and school districts around the state. Perhaps, the state government will enter into the discussion now that Judge Rhodes has ruled on the filing issue. Lastly, to a lesser extent some national precedents will be established by Detroit’s court approved Chapter 9 exit plan.

It will be interesting to watch this one develop and see if Detroit turns the bond world upside down.

Ronald P. Bernardi
President and CEO
Bernardi Securities, Inc.
December 20, 2013

Historical U.S. Treasury Bond Yield Curves

Red Line = November 2003 (New, 30-yr. Treasuries were not being issued at this time)
Orange Line = November 2008
Blue Line =  November 2013 (current)
Green Line = November 2012 

Over the years, we’ve talked about the concept of the cost of waiting, most recently in 2010. What it means is that you must invest at an ever increasing yield level within the same time limit to equal what you can get if you just invest available funds at today’s rates. This becomes important if the alternative to investing funds today means sitting in a very low or even, zero-percent interest rate money market account or ultra-short bond. This is logical but it bears repeating as it looks like short-term yields are going nowhere fast. Consider the following:

Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15th, 2008 and the financial crisis that followed severely impacted the global economy. This spurred unprecedented actions by the Federal Reserve Bank which included taking the Fed Funds and Discount rates to near zero and also the controversial, Quantitative Easing Programs whereby the Fed has been buying longer-term Treasury and mortgage backed bonds in their attempts to hold down interest rates to coax economic growth. You can see the effects of these actions (orange line) as yields began falling in late 2008. The Fed has been rather successful but market participants have been nudging the longer rates higher over the past few months as the economy has been showing signs of strength—see the Blue Line.

As of this writing, it appears that Janet Yellen will succeed current Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke. From her own comments we can assume that under her leadership, the Fed will maintain the easy money policy of zero-percent short rates into (or even beyond) 2016. However, it is looking more likely that the Fed will begin the process of tapering, that is, buying fewer longer-term bonds. This would likely result in a very steep yield curve with 1 to 5 year maturities essentially tethered to the zero-percent, Fed Funds rate and longer maturity bonds climbing to “normal”.

If the red line above (representing 2003) indicates where the yield curve should be once rates ultimately normalize, does this mean a spike in yields of 100 basis points or more is imminent? We experienced a rate-shock in May-June of this year on just such taper speculation.  While anything is possible, it is doubtful that this will happen as economic activity is not nearly as strong as it was in late 2003. Take a look at a few key comparisons* below:

What we feel will be the most likely scenario is that rates grind slowly upward in fits and starts with each new peak and each new valley ending at a higher point than the previous peak and valley.

If this is the course we can expect, then the logical “sweet-spot” in today’s market falls in the 7 to 12 year range. With these maturities you can expect to receive between 2.15% and 3.20% yield which captures roughly 72% of the yield of 30-year bonds, either Treasuries or AA rated municipals. Interestingly, the taxable, Treasury yields are almost identical to high-grade, tax-free yields using the AA MMD Scale for comparison—see below. When the taxable-equivalent yield is factored, the difference is striking.

What does all this mean? For investors sitting in cash or investing in short maturities waiting for rates to rise, unless you extend your ladder it is likely that you will be punished for a few more years. For investors with ladders that go longer than 12 years, stick to it, the yield curve and the ladder process is likely to reward you with increasing yields in the next few years.

Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Irish
Vice President

 

* Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics & the U.S. Federal Reserve

 

BSI_RBernardi_Slide.jpg

“There are two kinds of people in the world, my friend: Those with a rope around the neck, and the people who have the job of doing the cutting.”

– Tuco “the Ugly” (Eli Wallach), The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 1966

As the repeal of federal income tax-exemption of municipal bond interest continues to be a threat, let’s review talking points to share with lawmakers. These are based on thorough research and a thirty-two year career perspective of municipal bonds.

We wrap our topic around the iconic, 1966 spaghetti western film, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, a morality play pitting good versus evil with the juxtaposition serving as a cinematic allegory for our message. The present day municipal bond market represents “the Good” — the many WASHINGTON detractors of tax-exemption do not.

A clear and present danger

As we approach year-end, the threat to municipal bond tax exemption remains a clear and present danger. As long as congressional budget disagreement persists, as long as the Congressional Budget Office, Joint Committee on Taxation, and Treasury officials claim changing tax exemption will generate significant revenue — the threat remains. And it is not removed if Congress agrees to a narrow agreement on this year’s federal budget.

It is incumbent upon state and local government officials, taxpayers and citizens benefitting from public purpose infrastructure facilities to speak loudly and clearly demanding that federal income tax-exemption be left alone.

If these collective voices go unheeded, rest assured, the financial necks of towns, cities, villages, counties, school, water, sewer and park districts across the country will be snug in a noose and, as Tuco bluntly states, other people — tax-exemption opponents — will be “doing the cutting.”

The good — since 1913

Let’s turn to our theme citing some of the positive attributes of the tax-exempt bond market:

  • Tax-exempt bonds provide state and local governments with low cost financing. Today, “AAA” rated credits with a 10-year maturity borrow at approximately 2.65%, “A” rated issues of same maturity at 3.44% and bank qualified issuers can borrow at even lower interest rates.
  • Tax-exempt bonds provide a stable, reliable platform to finance public purpose projects.
  • In 2012, more than 6600 tax-exempt issues financed over $179 billion worth of infrastructure projects, according to the National League of Cities.
  • Tax-exempt municipal bonds create jobs for local citizens.
  • Bonds build America — from roads, schools and water/sewer plants to town halls and county courts.
  • Most citizens benefit from public purpose facilities financed by tax-exempt municipal bonds — many are taxpayers, some are not.
  • Tax-exemption encourages investment in public purpose infrastructure projects. It incents wealthy investors to invest funds in our communities.
  • Tax-exemption ensures local input and control over community projects. It helps ensure financial autonomy from Washington and its origin is rooted in the doctrine of reciprocal immunity, a basic tenet of our federalist system of government.

There is much “good” in the tax-exempt bond market. Challenge those who attempt to diminish it in any substantive manner.

The bad — really not so bad

Detractors of the tax-free market cite a number of shortcomings, claiming they represent “the Bad.” Some criticism is valid, although much of it is inflated and inaccurate.

Here are the major criticisms of municipal bond tax exemption and brief explanations debunking the alleged shortcomings:

  • “Significant cost to U.S. Treasury per Joint Committee of Taxation (JCT) studies.” Without question, the Treasury loses tax revenue because of tax-exemption. This is true about almost all tax expenditures and not unique to tax exemption. But blindly accepting JCT or Treasury calculations as the starting point of any discussion without questioning their accuracy distorts the issue. As the nearby chart shows, federal government calculations places tax exemption far down the list.

    Source:  Office of Tax Analysis in the Department of the Treasury and The Joint Committee on Taxation.

     

  • More importantly, the methodology used to calculate cost or Treasury’s foregone revenue is deeply flawed. It is fundamentally inaccurate because it relies on simplistic assumptions. One example: certain government methodology assumes investors will reinvest 100% of tax-free bond investment dollars into taxable bonds if repeal occurs resulting in significant additional taxes flowing into Treasury. This assumption is way off the mark and greatly overstates the cost of tax exemption. Many, likely most, investors will change their behavior if tax exemption is repealed or substantively reduced. Many will choose not to reinvest 100% of their current tax-free dollars into the taxable bond market if changes occur. Therefore, the figure cited in certain government’s tables is illusory and trumpeting this “cost” number in the halls of congress is terribly misleading. Our December 2011 white paper, Tax Exempt Municipal Bonds: The Case for an Efficient, Low Cost, Job Creating Tax Expenditure discusses this issue in great detail. The report cites several academic studies that challenge federal government calculations. Professors’ Poterba and Verdugo study illustrates the sensitivity of JCT revenue estimates for eliminating the interest tax-exemption to various alternative portfolio adjustments investors will make if tax exemption is changed. The bottom line of the report — the government’s revenue gain is on average almost 65% lower than JCT calculations.
  • “The wealthy benefit disproportionally from tax-exemption.” Tax expenditures are adopted to encourage individuals and businesses to participate in activities they would not participate in absent the tax inducement. That is the point of the tax expenditure. Tax exemption incents people to invest in our nation’s public purpose projects. Investors lend at low interest rates because income earned is not subject to federal income taxes. And it is not only the top “one percent” investing in our nation’s infrastructure. In 2010, per IRS data, approximately 3.3 million tax filers earning $100,000 or less invested in tax-free bonds with 50% of this group earning $50,000 or less.
  • “The federal subsidy inherent in tax exemption is inefficiently distributed.” Critics cite the existence of a “clearing rate” as evidence of significant market inefficiency. They claim it unfairly allocates a portion of the subsidy to top tax bracket investors rather than going to state and local governments. The clearing rate concept is generally described as the incremental increase in yield the issuer must pay on its bonds in order for the entire issue to be sold or “cleared.” Critics claim since not all investors in this market are at the top income tax bracket, an issuer pays some additional yield premium to make the bonds more attractive in an effort to induce lower bracket investors to buy the last remaining portion of an issue. This results in top tax bracket investors earning incrementally more yield than would have been otherwise demanded. This is viewed as windfall income by opponents of tax exemption. They claim it reduces the federal subsidy going to issuers and instead is a “freebie” to the wealthy.

Clearly, there are inefficiencies in the market. All markets exhibit certain inefficiencies so this is not a phenomenon unique to the tax-exempt market. But the critic’s “inefficiency” charge is overstated on several levels. It ignores obvious differences between municipal bond market dynamics and the comparable corporate market model federal government officials use to conclude top taxpayers are earning windfall income. Once again, some of the underlying assumptions relied on are wrong — making the model comparison invalid. There are significant differences between the municipal and corporate bond markets: call feature optionality, diversity and sheer number of different issuers, average maturity per issue, average trading block size, and real and perceived credit metric differences to name a few. These are all contributing factors determining the final yield level of a tax-exempt issue. The clearing rate of a typical issue results from the municipal bond market’s inherently idiosyncratic nature.

We all recall the short-lived Build America Bond (BAB) program. According to Treasury, a primary, positive feature of the program was its heightened efficiency. Treasury claimed more of the federal subsidy flowed to the issuer rather than wealthy investors in the form of the clearing rate effect than is the case with the tax-exempt market.

A comprehensive report published by the Swiss Finance Institute debunks this claim and shows the BAB program was rife with pricing inefficiencies. A clearing rate issue clearly existed in this market as well even though few top tax bracket investors bought BAB issues. Why? Because taxable investors recognize the same idiosyncratic features unique to the municipal bond market and demand higher yields to induce them to invest. The clearing rate issue present in today’s tax-exempt market does not represent a significant windfall yield freebie to top tax payers as government officials claim. It results from investors demanding higher yields to offset idiosyncrasies of the municipal bond market place.

The good attributes of the tax-exempt market far outweigh the so-called bad ones. Challenge those who attempt to diminish it in any substantive manner.

The ugly — really ugly

If tax exemption is repealed or substantively altered, market participants will adapt and adjust. Local governments will continue to need capital for projects. Bernardi Securities, Inc. will continue to assist state, local governments and investors as we have done for decades. We are experts in the field and the need for municipal bond market expertise will not disappear.

State and local governments — and most of their citizens — however, will face many difficult choices if tax exemption is repealed or substantively reduced. Here’s why:

  • Increased financing costs for local infrastructure projects. On February 6, 2013, Ann Arbor, MI came to market with a taxable and tax-exempt issue both rated AA+. The 2023 maturities yielded 2.50% and 2.0% respectively. In other words, Ann Arbor’s taxable borrowing rate for the 10-year taxable loan is 25% higher than its tax-exempt borrowing costs for the same time period. That is a significant incremental cost that will affect almost everyone living in Ann Arbor. The cost differentials for other time periods were not as extreme as the 10-year spot, but still notable. Compared to Ann Arbor, we would expect less frequent and lower credit quality issuers to experience larger borrowing cost differentials.
  • Higher local taxes and user fees. Capital needs of state and local governments will not disappear if current tax exemption is repealed, partially taxed or replaced with taxable market. Local residents will see tax and fee increases to cover higher financing costs.
  • Reduced project scope, outright cancellation in some cases. Reluctance or inability to increase local taxes or fees to cover increased financing costs will lead to scaled back projects or cancellation.
  • A less efficient market with loss of local autonomy in decision making and more federal oversight. Some tax-exemption detractors seek to replace the tax-exempt market with tax credits. This is a time-tested idea that is a proven failure. The market is thin and terribly inefficient and has been for the more than 30 years I have been in this business. It would be a colossal mistake to attempt to replace the current market with a tax credit alternative. The BAB program offered a tax credit option choice and there was a near complete lack of interest from both issuers and investors. Approximately $200 billion of BAB issuance occurred with the tax credit component comprising less than one percent. One reason is lack of trust by investors and issuers that the federal government will honor any commitments long term. Why should issuers and investors be assured the federal government will not renege on its tax credit commitment in the years ahead given its failure to honor its BAB subsidy commitment to state and local governments — a program that just ended a few years ago?
  • Diminished, if not complete loss, of local decision making power over community infrastructure projects. Tax exemption helps ensure local decision making surrounding infrastructure projects. Tax exemption is not just another special interest tax expenditure like the mortgage interest, earned income tax credit or defined benefit plan deductions. Tax-exemption was codified into law as part of the Revenue Act of 1913. The aforementioned tax expenditures did not receive this distinction, in part, because lawmakers wanted to help ensure the doctrine of reciprocal immunity for state and local governments (“the power to tax involves the power to destroy”) — a basic tenet on which our federalist system of government is founded. Tax exemption helps ensure this doctrine. Repeal it, substantively reduce it and Washington bureaucrats will have an even greater say in decisions surrounding your local school building project, village hall expansion, city water plant upgrade, community recreation facility or county courthouse project. The list is long and will affect nearly everyone.

Tax exemption call to action

“I’ll keep the money and you can have the rope.”

– Blondie “the Good” (Clint Eastwood) to Tuco, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 1966

The goal is for state and local governments to “keep the money” — the unencumbered right to issue tax-exempt bonds to build public purpose projects. This is what needs to be done. Speak up and speak out.

Ask lawmakers to enact sensible improvements that will strengthen the current tax-exempt market. Here are a few of our thoughts:

  • Insist that Congress positively assert tax exemption for public purpose infrastructure projects is sacrosanct. Remove the threat of repeal or idea of capping its value at an arbitrary 28% level. Absolute clarity on this issue will reduce uncertainty, market volatility and improve market efficiency. Greater certainty lowers borrowing costs for communities. That is good for all.
  • Refine the scope of “public purpose infrastructure projects” as the current universe of valid tax-exempt projects is too broad. Doing so will reduce the new issue supply. Market efficiency will improve, borrowing costs for communities across the country will decline and Treasury will receive increased revenue. Each year there are many new non-public purpose projects that receive a tax-exempt subsidy. The number of these types of tax-exempt projects should be reduced requiring them to come to market as taxable loans.
  • A modified Build America Bond program for public purpose projects should be reinstated. In spite of the severe damage sequestration has had on the view many have of the program, state and local governments and their citizens may benefit from a modified version. Such a program would provide state and local governments with an alternate financing option when the tax-exempt market becomes too volatile and costly, as was the case in late 2008 and 2009. The program would offer a reduced federal subsidy of 20-25% and serve as a market governor of sorts. Issuers would rely on BAB issuance to raise funds if and when the traditional tax-free market became too costly. Placing a limit on the amount of issuance would help limit program issuance abuse.
  • Increase “bank qualified” issue size allowance
  • Improve issuer disclosure practices. Our 2011 Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds white paper suggested that implementing standardized required reporting mechanisms and universal recognition by issuers of the importance of compliance would greatly enhance our marketplace. We discussed municipal disclosure improvements in some detail during our recent Public Finance Roundtable, as well as the public finance panel discussion I moderated at the 2013 Bond Dealers of America National Fixed Income Conference. The latter conversation also covered the threat to municipal bond tax exemption.

Before discarding or severely limiting tax-exemption there needs to be a discussion about what it has accomplished over the last century and how it is interwoven into the political and economic fabric of our society. It is important for all citizens to help shape this debate. It should not be controlled by a handful of federal policy makers and congressional staffers removed from the reality of running local government and removed from living in our communities. The discussion should be led by state and local officials from across the country who understand what it takes to run local government. It should be shaped by citizens who pay taxes, by citizens who use and benefit from public purpose facilities financed by tax-exempt bonds.

For all of its shortcomings, the tax-exempt public finance market is envied around the world. It is efficient and reliable. State and local governments have relied on it for 100 years to raise capital to build our nation’s infrastructure.

If we believe in the principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution, if we believe state and local governments should have wide latitude to independently finance public purpose infrastructure projects their citizens need, want and are willing to pay for — then radical changes to the present day municipal bond market should not occur. Substantively changing the market will affect all of us in a significant way.

Ronald P. Bernardi
President and CEO
Bernardi Securities, Inc.
December 4, 2013

Last month was a turbulent experience for the Treasury markets, though municipals have been able to sustain a relative rally. The catalyst to each ebb and flow of last month’s bond market has left our purview as the debt ceiling crisis and brinksmanship in D.C. rattle markets today. However, as bond market investors, we cannot lose sight of last month’s market influences and how they may impact us in the future.

Municipals outperformed Treasuries

The 10-year Treasury note rose above 3% early in the morning of September 6th. At that point it was already up 0.22% in yield for the month and up 1.25% in yield year-to-date. As of October 10th, the 10-year Treasury has round-tripped and more, coming back down to 2.71%. The cause for the bond market rally began with Larry Summers withdrawing his name for consideration for Fed chair – as he was perceived as anti-QE – and then was considerably augmented after the Fed decided against tapering during their September FOMC meeting. On that very day the 10-year Treasury dropped from 2.86% to 2.68%. The municipal market displayed less volatility and generally outperformed Treasuries during September. The 10-year municipal/Treasury yield ratio began the month at 110% and is currently at 103% (i.e. municipal yields were 110% of the 10-year Treasury). Although municipal bonds outperformed Treasuries in September, yields are still at higher nominal rates before factoring in the effective value of the federal income tax exemption.

Fed misinterpretation & lingering volatility

Why such turbulence? There are numerous reasons, of course. A major contributing factor is investor misinterpretation of Federal Reserve communications related to its monthly purchases of mortgages and bonds. From inception, the Fed communicated to investors its policy would be “data-dependent”. However, the market inferred from Fed commentary over the last several months that it was comfortable enough with economic data to begin to taper these monthly purchases. Those expectations contributed greatly to the 10-year Treasury bond rising to 3% in early September. When the FOMC released their statement on September 18th it became apparent to readers that tapering would not occur in September, leading to this month’s rally.

Until the Fed is comfortable with the underlying economic strength – both job creation and price stability – we expect their unconventional policies will continue. Expect volatility to linger as well.

As always, please call us if you have any questions or would like us to help you review your portfolio.

Sincerely,

Matt Bernardi
Bernardi Securities, Inc.
October 10, 2013

The Bernardi Securities August 2013 market commentary written by Scott Rausch, Outperforming the Madness of Municipal Bond Fund Herds, was mentioned in an August 30, 2013 blog post on MarketWatch as a market professional perspective on mitigating the consequences of bond fund outflows. 

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